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Local water markets for irrigation in southern
Spain: A multicriteria approach
 
Manuel Arriaza, Jose Â A. Go Â mez-Limo Â n and Martin Upton*
Spanish authorities have recently approved a new legislative framework for the
creation of local water markets to improve allocative eciency for this scarce
resource. This paper analyses the potential impacts of the policy. A utility function
for three groups of farmers was elicited, using a method that does not require
interaction with the decision-makers. Utility was measured as a function of the ®rst
two moments of the distribution of total gross margin. The utility functions were
then used to simulate farmers' responses to changes in the price of water.
1. Introduction
In Spain, irrigated agriculture accounts for 60 per cent of agricultural
production. Only 19 per cent of that area is cultivated (3.6 million hectares)
and consumes 80 per cent of the total water supply. Due largely to the
Mediterranean climate, the average productivity of irrigated agriculture is
339 000 Ptas/ha
1 compared to 48 000 Ptas/ha of non-irrigated land (Min-
isterio de Medio Ambiente 1998).
Spanish law de®nes water as a `public good' that cannot be privately
traded. Spanish territory is divided into Regional Water Authorities or
watershed management bodies, called Confederaciones Hidrogra®cas. These
are governmental agencies that assign water to the irrigation management
units known as Comunidades de Regantes. These farmers' associations
distribute water to the members who pay the costs of distribution,
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The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 46:1, pp. 21±43maintenance of infrastructure, control and administration, etc., to the
management unit. These costs are computed per hectare and a given
maximum amount of water is made available each year.
Psychologically each farmer assumes that they have paid the full cost of
the water. In fact, only part of the distribution cost is paid as a ®xed water
charge by the farmer. The marginal cost per cubic metre of water is zero.
Because of this allocative framework, a large amount of water is used to
irrigate crops subsidised under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
These crops are grown under extensive conditions that have low
productivity and low labour demand. In addition, the amount of water
loss in the distribution channels and the heavy consumption of water at
the plot level has moved the political consensus in the direction of
modernising legislation as a ®rst step towards changing the situation.
These are the main reasons behind the recently approved measure for
changing the current system. The new legislation will enable farmers to sell
their concessions to other farmers, thus facilitating the development of a
local water market.
The aim of this paper was to forecast the behaviour of farmers facing a
local water market. A methodological framework was developed to assess the
consequences of the introduction of water markets for farm incomes and
levels of employment. For this purpose, we used a multicriteria model to
simulate the farmers' decision-making process in a community of southern
Spain (El Bajo Guadalquivir).
2. Methodology
In modelling farmers' behaviour, two approaches were commonly used:
(i) mathematical programming; and (ii) econometric models. Kingwell (1996)
outlines some advantages of mathematical programming over econometric
models. First, it does not require long data series and second, it readily
incorporates interactions between alternative activities and the eect of
constraint limitations simultaneously. These circumstances led us to choose
this analytical framework in order to achieve the objective proposed earlier.
On the other hand, mathematical programming has signi®cant disadvan-
tages, such as needing to de®ne the list of activities and technology
alternatives to be included and the danger of aggregation bias. To limit the
eect of aggregation bias we grouped farmers into subsets with similar crop
distributions and constraint levels. To avoid overspecialisation of the model
farm plans, prices for vegetables were treated as being endogenously
determined, declining as production was increased.
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Garrido, 1995; Sumpsi et al. 1998). From an empirical point of view the
studies of Weinberg et al. (1993), Booker and Young (1994) for California,
Becker (1995) for Israel and Garrido (1998) deserve attention. In general,
these authors conclude that the implementation of a local water market
increases the eciency of allocation of this resource.
Although our work was in¯uenced by the aforementioned studies, the
methodological approach we used was somewhat dierent. We assumed that,
unlike in the classical approach, the farmer's utility level was determined not
only by pro®t but also by a measure of risk (the variance as the second
statistical moment of the pro®t). Thus, the amount of water that farmers
demand depends on the value of the utility function and not exclusively on
the productivity of this resource.
Although an economic agent deals with many criteria in the decision-
making process, economic theory has conventionally used models with a
single, well-de®ned objective that is optimised (e.g. pro®t). Hurwicz (1973)
considers that this simpli®cation of reality was a necessary step in the
progress towards a solution to multicriteria problems. Friedman (1962)
criticises the single-objective approach, arguing that this approach treats
choice simply as a technological problem without value judgements in its
solution. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), in one of the ®rst
works on multicriteria analysis, explain economic acts as a result of
many, usually con¯icting, objectives. In the agricultural ®eld there are
many researchers who favour the use of multicriteria decision-making
techniques (MCDM) (e.g. Hazell (1971); Gasson (1973); Hatch et al.
(1974); Herath (1981); Rehman and Romero (1993); and Amador et al.
(1998)).
For the purposes of this study it was assumed that the farmer's objective
was to maximise a weighted sum of the expected income (total gross margin)
and its variance. This approach may be justi®ed either as a case of an additive
form of Multi-attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) or as the expected value of a
quadratic utility function.
2.1 MAUT and the form of the utility function
It is often argued that MAUT has the most sound theoretical structure of all
the multicriteria techniques (Ballestero and Romero 1998). At the same time,
from a practical point of view, the direct elicitation of utility functions
presents many drawbacks. In this paper, we used a methodology that
overcame these limitations.
In MAUT, the utilities of n attributes of alternative options are captured in
aquantitativewayviaautilityfunction.Mathematically,UU(x1,x2,¼,xn).
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2 the formulation becomes
Uf{u1(x1), u2(x2), ¼, un(xn)} or in simple additive form:
Ux1;x2;...;xnRwiuixi; i  1;2;...;n 1
where it is often assumed that 0 £ wi £ 1 and S wi1 (Keeney 1974).
The additive utility function has been widely used to model farmers'
decisions when the uncertainty attribute is involved. The ranking of
alternatives is obtained by adding contributions from each attribute. Because
attributes are measured in dierent units, normalisation is required to allow
addition. Each attribute's weight expresses its relative importance.
Fishburn (1982) presents the mathematical requirements for assuming an
additive function. From a practical point of view, two conditions must be
satis®ed (Hardaker et al. 1997). First, attributes must be preferentially
independent. The level of one attribute must not aect the preference for any
other attribute. Second, the utility value of one attribute must be independent
of the level of another.
Although these conditions are restrictive, Edwards (1977) and Farmer
(1987) have shown that the additive function yields extremely close
approximations to the hypothetical true function even when these conditions
are not satis®ed. In Hwang and Yoon's words (1981, p. 103): `theory,
simulation computations and experience all suggest that the additive method
yields extremely close approximations to much more complicated non-linear
forms, while remaining far easier to use and understand'. Hardaker et al.
(1997, p. 164) consider this approximation as reasonable over a relatively
narrow range of values.
Once the use of the additive utility function had been justi®ed, we took a
step further and assumed that the individual attribute utility functions were




wjrij; i  1;...;m 2
where Ui is the utility value of alternative i, wj is the weight of attribute j and
rij is the value of attribute j for alternative i.
Although the assumption of linearity of the individual attribute utility
function is rather strong and may be unrealistic, the validation of the model
supports this decision. Because our aim was to rank alternatives in the same
way the decision-maker would do, the precise mathematical form of the
utility function was of secondary importance. The ®ndings of this study
2An attribute xi is utility-independent of the other n ) 1 attributes xj if preferences for
lotteries involving different levels of attribute xi do not depend on the levels of the other n ) 1
attributes xj. See for example Huirne and Hardaker (1998).
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the farmers' own utility functions. Furthermore, the use of the expected value
variance (E-V) linear approximation gave a local measure of risk aversion.
2.2 Attributes of the utility function
For the elicitation of the utility functions two attributes were used:
1. Expected total gross margin, as a measure of the achievement of the
objective of pro®t maximisation. There were two implicit assumptions:
(i) that utility or preferences can be evaluated just as well in terms of total
gross margin (TGM) and net income; and (ii) that ®xed costs were not
stochastic.
2. Variance of the TGM, as a measure of the achievement of the objective of
risk minimisation. Because the aim was to minimise the variance, the
values rij are de®ned as the negative of the variance.
The choice of attributes was supported by a survey of 65 farmers in the area
studied. One question in the survey was intended to rank the farmers'
objectives from one to four. Three objectives were suggested by the authors:
(i) maximisation of gross margin; (ii) minimisation of risk; and (iii) minimi-
sation of labour hire. Hardly anyone mentioned a fourth objective. Thus, 22
farmers claimed that the maximisation of total gross margin was their only
objective. When considering two objectives, the most common answer was,
®rst, the maximisation of gross margin, and then, the minimisation of risk (26
farmers). Only one-third of all farmers mentioned three objectives, and
among them, 73 per cent ranked the maximisation of gross margin and the
minimisation of total risk as the two most important objectives. Based on
these results, it was concluded that the maximisation of total gross margin
and the minimisation of risk provided a good approximation to the true
utility function. The observed dierences among survey farms in their choice
of crops was attributed to dierences between farmers' utility functions.
A second issue was the choice of the variance as a measure of risk, and not,
for example, the standard deviation or the total absolute deviation (TAD). In
order to test the eect of dierent measures of risk on the ranking of
alternatives, we built one utility function with the attributes expected total
gross margin and variance, and two others with the same measure of
expected value but using the standard deviation or the TAD as a measure of
risk (the elicitation procedure is explained below). Five crop distributions
were ranked. The ®rst (A) was the observed crop distribution, then
progressively, the percentage of risky crops was increased from 52 per cent
in case A up to 85 per cent in case E. We assumed that, due to the large
changes considered, and based on their indigenous knowledge from the
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ranking of the ®ve alternatives by the three models matched the assumed
farmers' preferences. Thus, this methodology seems to yield similar results
even when using dierent measures of risk.
2.3 Use of a linear `utility function' as a local approximation to the slope
of the E-V frontier
The additive functional form has been elicited on the grounds of expected
utility theory using techniques that involve the choice by the decision-maker
between a certain outcome and a lottery (Anderson et al. 1977; Biswas 1997
and Hardaker et al. 1997).
Expected utility (EU) ranking, based only on the ®rst two moments (mean
and variance) of the expected return, was justi®ed if some restrictions were
placed on either the decision-maker's preferences or on the distribution of
gross margins. Thus, if the utility function of the decision-maker was
quadratic or all distributions were normal, the optimum EU would have been
in the E-V ecient set (Levy and Markowitz 1979). Similar results can be
found with mean standard deviation approximations (Tobin 1963 and
Hawawani 1978). A less restrictive condition applies to the adoption of a
two-moment decision model based on the location and scale parameters
(Meyer 1987; Meyer and Rashe 1992). According to this condition, the
ranking of the two-moment decision model will be consistent with the EU
criterion if the random variables dier from one another only by location and
scale parameters.
3 Furthermore, this condition is met by a variety of
economic models.
The expected utility of a lottery E[U(x)] derived from a quadratic utility
function can be expressed as follows:
EUx  Exbr2  Ex fg
2 3
where b is normally expected to be negative (Robison and Barry 1987,
p. 309). This, of course, is a linear additive function in the expected (mean)
value, E(x), and the variance, r
2.
A quadratic utility function implies increasing absolute risk aversion
(Robison and Barry 1987, p. 33), a strong assumption with weak theoretical
support. However, Anderson et al. (1977, p. 93) claim that polynomial utility
functions (particularly quadratic) are suitable for empirical analysis.
Although polynomials are not monotonically increasing everywhere, they
3All random variables Yi differ from one another only by location and scale parameters if,
for all X (X is a random variable obtained from one of the Yi using the normalising
transformation X  Yi ÿ lii=ri, all Yi are equal in distribution to li  riX (Meyer 1987).
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over a particular range of gains or losses, no one would recommend their use
beyond that range'. They continue that, even when the true utility function is
not quadratic, the quadratic utility function may not necessarily lead to error.
While the utility of each risky prospect may be assessed incorrectly, the
overall set of prospects may still be correctly ranked depending on how
in¯uential the higher moments are. Finally, even assuming that in most cases
increasing absolute risk aversion is not acceptable, `we can rationalise a risk-
averse polynomial utility function for gains and losses as simply a local
approximation to a concave risk-averse utility function for wealth' (Robison
and Barry 1987, p. 33).
The other condition to ensure consistency between E-V analysis and EU
maximisation relates to the statistical distribution of the outcomes.
Samuelson (1970) showed that a risk-averse decision-maker will ®nd the
EU optimum in the E-V set as long as the distributions of returns are
normal. Although this condition is rarely observed in practice, Tsiang
(1972), using a dierent Taylor-series expansion than the one used by Levy
and Markowitz (1979), proved that, even when the utility function is not
quadratic and does not have normally distributed distributions, a two-
moment decision model can be a good approximation to the true expected
utility function when the risk remains small relative to the total wealth of
the decision-maker.
However, as Robison and Hason (1997, p. 124) point out, the accuracy
of the approximation of the E-V model to the EU model when none of the
conditions are met (quadratic utility function, normally distributed returns
or location±scale condition) has not been carefully examined. Yet,
according to them, `consistency between E-V and EU models may still be
obtained because changes in skewness most often change the means and
variances as well in ways that leave ranking between the two models
consistent'.
2.4 Elicitation method for the utility functions
Sumpsi et al. (1993 and 1997) and Amador et al. (1998) propose a method
for assessing a farmer's utility function, without direct interaction between
the farmer and the researcher. They show how it is possible to elicit the
farmer's utility function by observing only the actual crop distribution. We
adopted this methodology to assess the utility function of a group of farmers.
The steps were as follow:
1. De®ne mathematically each attribute as a function of a decision column
vector (x), representing the area covered by each crop. In this paper we
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is a vector of crop expected gross margins per hectare; and (ii) the
variance (V) of the total gross margin, Vx¢áMáx, where M is the
variance±covariance matrix of a 5-year time series of gross margins.
2. For the average-sized farm in the stratum, calculating the optimum farm
plan for each attribute is treated as the sole objective (maximisation of
TGM and minimisation of V). This produces a two by two matrix, P,i n
which each element, fij, is the value of the ith objective when the jth
objective is optimised. In order to avoid zero solutions when minimising
risk, we restricted the solution to an assured minimum level of total gross
margin per hectare (the hiring-out price of land).
3. Solve the following system of q (number of objectives) equations:
X q
j1
wjfij  fi i  1;2;...;q; and
X q
j1
wj  1 4
where fij is the corresponding element of the previous matrix and fi is the
value achieved for the ith objective according to the observed crop
distribution. As not all farms in the stratum are equal in size, the elements
f1 and f2 (observed TGM and V, respectively) must be calculated for the
average-sized farm. For example, if the maximum TGM for an average
7.5 ha farm is 100 u., and the observed TGM value of a 9 ha farm is
125 u., then the fi value in the equation is (7.5/9)á125 u. In the case of the
variance, the ratio has to be the square [(7.5/9)
2].
4. If the former system does not give a set of w (weights of each objective),









wjfij  ni ÿ pi  fi i  1;2;...;q;
X q
j1
wj  1 5
5. This procedure was applied to every one of the 65 farmers, and then the
average weight of each objective was calculated for a relatively
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on the objective j (pro®t maximisation or risk minimisation), and wjk is the
weight attached by each farmer (k) to the same objective j within the group i.
The number of farmers in each group (i) is denoted ni.
Dyer (1977) has shown that the weights obtained in step 6 are consistent





where fi(x) is the mathematical formulation of the value placed on the ith
attribute x, and ki is a normalising factor (e.g. maximum value of the ith
objective in the matrix P minus the minimum). In Appendix I the weighting
of attributes is explained with a ®gure.
As the farming systems are reasonably homogeneous within groups, it is
assumed that all members face the same set of activities and constraints.
Thus, there is a single, unique optimum farm plan for the whole group for
each given objective. The cropping patterns within each group that were
obtained from the survey were suciently similar to justify the assumption of
a common utility function for all members of the group.
3. Area of study
The El Bajo Guadalquivir community of irrigators is located in southern
Spain in the Guadalquivir Valley. The crops grown in this irrigated area are
shown in table 1.
This district has a typical Mediterranean climate with hot and dry summers
and cold winters. In an average year there is 507 mm of rain, with an average
temperature of 19.2°C. In the northern part of the district the soils are mainly
Entisols, while in the south they are a mix of Entisols and Vertisols. The
water consumption was 5311 m
3/ha in 1996 and 7275 m
3/ha in 1997.
Table 1 Crop distribution in El Bajo Guadalquivir (percentages and total hectarage)
1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998
Cotton 37.8 59.0 51.4
Sun¯ower 26.9 12.4 15.3
Cereals (excluding rice) 11.2 12.1 19.6
Sugar beet 14.2 10.2 8.8
Vegetables 3.4 3.7 3.1
Others 4.2 1.3 0.9
Set aside 2.3 1.3 0.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Arable crops (hectares) 42 859 42 604 42 437
Total crops (hectares) 54 050 54 050 54 050
Source: Community of irrigators El Bajo Guadalquivir.
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the sampling quota assigned to each stratum. Farmers that had fewer than
5 ha were not considered. This is because farming provided only a minimal
part of their total income (the average farm size in this stratum was only
1.4 ha) and they would have been less likely to be involved in the water
market. The size of each quota was proportional to the number of farmers
within the group. To save travel costs, cluster sampling was used to select
the farmers to be interviewed in three dierent locations.
4. The mathematical model
As already outlined in the methodology, we had to ®rst de®ne the objectives
to be considered. The survey revealed that most farmers considered the
maximisation of total gross margin and the minimisation of risk, assumed to
be represented by the variance of the total gross margin, to be their two main
objectives.
4
Estimates of expected total gross margin and its variance were obtained
from a time series over 5 years. The gross margin for each crop in this
time series was provided by an accounting ®rm in the area studied. The
farms in this database were similar, in terms of crop distributions and
production possibilities, to the farms in the communities of irrigators of
the area studied. The gross margins were double-checked with the results
from the survey.
The gross margin's variance may have been overestimated due to
dierences in conditions from farm to farm and its covariance may have
been underestimated, so we carried out an experiment to test for the eects of
smaller variances (30 per cent reduction) and greater covariances (30 per cent
increase) on the ranking ability of the utility function. Both models ranked
the distributions of ®ve crops in the same way (although the utility values
were slightly dierent).
Table 2 Land distribution among farmers in 1998 and strati®ed sampling quotas
<5 ha 5±10 ha 10±20 ha >20 ha Total
No. farmers 2662 689 1001 446 4 798
Total hectarage 3827 5289 12 473 29 712 51 301
Distribution of the
65 interviews
None 21 29 15
Source: Community of irrigators El Bajo Guadalquivir.
4An accounting ®rm provided panel data on 40 farms in the area of study over 5 years.
These data were used to model risk and to compare with the survey results.
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agricultural policy constraints, which had a quota for sugar beet and durum
wheat. At least 10 per cent of COP (cereals, oilseeds and protein crops) were
set aside. Second, there were agronomic constraints which prevented the
sowing of wheat and sun¯ower over two consecutive years on the same plot.
The crop distribution of each farmer was used to obtain the weights attached
by the farmers to the total gross margin and risk objectives.
Table 3 shows the average farm size and the extreme values of the expected
total gross margin and the variance in each stratum. The results of the model,
using the average weights for the two attributes considered, are also
presented.
In considering the mean variance preference function
U  a  TGM ÿ b  V ; 8
2áb/a is a local measure of absolute risk aversion (Chavas and Pope 1982;
Coyle 1992 and 1999). The absolute risk aversion coecients in increasing
order of farm size were 0.0013, 0.0018 and 0.0006. There was no clear




















738 1 548 5 856
Max variance 243 681 586 164 9 009 064
Min variance 23 065 41 168 1 135 648













Slopeb/a 0.00065 0.00088 0.00031
Source: own estimates.
*To calculate: 86/(1613±738)0.09829.
 TGM, total gross margin.
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results coincide with other studies (Bond and Wonder 1980; Hamal and
Anderson 1982).
The utility functions were maximised in order to simulate farmers'
responses to changes in the price of water. An increase in the water price
reduced the gross margin of each crop according to the level of application.
To allow sowing without irrigation (wheat and sun¯owers were watered only
by rain), new activities were included in the model with new gross margins.
The policy changes aected the cost structure and therefore the gross
margins. However, subtracting a constant (the water cost) from each column
of gross margins in the time series matrix (crops in columns) did not change
the variance±covariance matrix, therefore the old matrix could have been
used. This would not have applied for major policy changes and long run
analysis, where prices and yields would have been aected.
5. Validation of the model
Validation of the estimated utility functions was based on two procedures.
First, assuming that farmers produce at a point close to their maximum
utility, the optimum plan for each stratum should not dier greatly from the
observed crop distribution. This was found to be the case in general (see
table 4). The comparison of model predictions with real system outputs is, in
practice, a common procedure to validate models (Rigby and Young 1996;
Qureshi et al. 1999).
Second, the ranking of alternative crop production activities based on the
estimated utility function was compared with the farmers' own preference
ranking, and found to be identical.
Although the ®rst validation procedure may have suered from a circular
argument (the utility functions are derived from farmers' behaviour and then
validated by reproducing their behaviour), the two validation procedures
together supported our con®dence in the use of the estimated utility functions
to model the farmers' decision-making process.
6. Elicitation of water demand curves
The farmers' responses to water price increases was simulated by using the
three elicited utility functions after reducing the crop gross margins
according to water prices and crop water use. The initial situation
(price0 Ptas/m
3) was compared with progressive price increases for water
that were included in the models as variable costs, which reduced the crop
gross margins. Table 5 summarises the derived water demand for each
stratum.
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demand; MFD, medium farmer demand; LFD, large farmer demand)
decreased, in general, as farm size increased. Total quantity demanded per
hectare was the sum of the group mean levels of water consumption per
hectare, weighted by the stratum size (in hectares) as a percentage of the total
area. Thus, Total D(SFDá5289 + MFDá12 473 + LFDá29 712)/47 474.
Figure 1 shows the three demand curves. Although they dier in shape,
they follow a similar pattern, as reported in other studies (Wahl 1989;
Garrido 1998; Sumpsi et al. 1998; Go Â mez-Limo Â n and Berbel 2000).
To analyse the dierences in the elasticity of demand between curves,
table 6 presents the arc elasticity of demand for each price interval. For a
price lower than 10 Ptas/m
3 the curves are rather inelastic, implying that
farmers do not change their cropping pattern signi®cantly. Only for higher
prices does the elasticity increase.
7. Results of the water market simulation
7.1 Water trade
In the simulation we simpli®ed the market by considering only three
economic agents: small, medium and large farmers. Every agent bought or
sold according to the utility derived from each unit of water at a given price.
Unlike the assumptions of neoclassical theory, the use of the resource was not
directly determined by its productivity but by its utility.
Table 5 Water demand for small, medium and large farm-sized farmers




























0 4913 25.98 4453 55.54 3997 118.77 4219 200.29
5 4778 25.27 3815 47.59 3445 102.37 3691 175.23
10 4518 23.90 3178 39.64 2937 87.26 3176 150.79
15 3531 18.68 2712 33.83 2499 74.26 2670 126.77
20 1920 10.15 1937 24.17 1802 53.53 1851 87.85
25 609 3.22 578 7.21 640 19.02 621 29.46
30 534 2.82 406 5.06 388 11.54 409 19.42
35 458 2.42 139 1.73 71 2.10 132 6.25
40 284 1.50 114 1.42 59 1.74 98 4.67
Source: own estimates.
LFD, large farmers' demand; LFTD, large farmers' total demand; MFD, medium farmers' demand;
MFTD, medium farmers' total demand; SFD, small farmers' demand; SFTD, small farmers' total
demand.
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each group of farmers (see ®gure 1). The supply of water was exogenously
determined by the water authorities. The amount supplied per hectare was
largely determined by the water stock in the reservoirs. Thus, in the short
run, water supply was completely inelastic. This amount was distributed on a
per hectare basis.
In the absence of a local water market, the quantity demanded for each
group was indicated by S, M and L (see ®gure 1), for small, medium and
large farmers, respectively. These points represented the marginal utility of
water for each type of farmer, measured in monetary terms by PS,P M and PL.
The marginal utility differences provided incentives for water trade among
the groups.
Given that the maximum aggregated quantity demanded for a zero water
price was 4218 m
3/ha, in a year with a normal supply (greater than 5000 m
3/
ha), no trade in water would have occurred (there was an excess of supply).
However, due to cyclical droughts, a supply of 3000 m
3/ha, or even lower,
was a more likely scenario. In this particular case (supply of 3000 m
3/ha), the
marginal utility, re¯ected in the willingness to pay, for small, medium and
large farmers was 16.8, 11.4 and 9.1 Ptas/m
3, respectively. The equilibrium
was at the price±quantity combination (PE,Q 3000), at a price of approxi-
mately 12 Ptas/m
3. Thus, because PE >P M,PL and PE <P S, medium and
Figure 1 Water demand curve for each stratum
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of water for small farmers was greater than the price. The water trade would
take place until the marginal utilities of all groups were equal (note that
transaction costs are not considered in this analysis).
At the equilibrium price, PE, small farmers moved from S to S¢, and were
willing to pay for an additional amount of water measured by the distance
ES¢. The consumers' surplus for the small farmers increased by the area
PSSS'PE. Accordingly, the equilibrium for medium and large farmers
changed to M¢ and L¢, respectively. These two groups offered quantities of
water to small farmers, measured by EM¢ and EL¢. The losses of consumer
surplus for medium and large farmers are de®ned by the areas PMMM'PE
and PLLL'PE, respectively. The extra income from the water sale offset these
surplus reductions.
The following table shows estimates of water transfers for several supply
scenarios (at dierent equilibrium prices).
From the previous results, it follows that, for most price levels, small and
medium farmers buy water. For most levels of supply, the volume of traded
water is very small compared with the total amount in the market. Only when
the quantity supplied is less than 400 m
3/ha (in an average year the supply is
6000 m
3/ha), are the transfers greater than 5 per cent of the total amount of
water used in the community of irrigators.
Although there is an income transfer from small and medium farmers to
large ones, this should not pose any problems of social injustice, as the
groups that buy water do it in order to increase their utility (Rawls 1971).
7.2 Economic impact
The economic analysis cannot be limited to the ®nancial transfers. To assess
the whole economic impact of the introduction of local water markets, it is












0±5 )0.01 )0.08 )0.07 )0.07
5±10 )0.08 )0.27 )0.24 )0.22
10±15 )0.61 )0.40 )0.40 )0.43
15±20 )2.07 )1.17 )1.14 )1.27
20±25 )4.66 )4.86 )4.28 )4.48
25±30 )0.73 )1.93 )2.70 )2.26
30±35 )0.99 )6.37 )9.00 )6.67
35±40 )3.51 )1.50 )1.38 )2.18
Source: own estimates.
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Price D
SF sales MF sales LF sales
















0 4219 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 3691 )1087 )5.75 )124 )1.55 246 7.30 7.30 4.16 36.49
10 3176 )1342 )7.10 )2 )0.02 239 7.12 7.12 4.72 71.16
15 2670 )861 )4.55 )42 )0.52 171 5.08 5.08 4.01 76.16
20 1851 )69 )0.37 )87 )1.08 49 1.45 1.45 1.65 29.01
25 621 11 0.06 42 0.53 )20 )0.59 0.59 1.99 14.64
30 409 )124 )0.66 3 0.04 21 0.62 0.66 3.39 19.75
35 132 )326 )1.73 )7 )0.09 61 1.82 1.82 29.06 63.56
40 98 )186 )0.98 )15 )0.19 40 1.18 1.18 25.22 47.07
Source: own estimates.



















































































































2necessary to estimate the variations in gross margin due to selling/buying
water.
The introduction of a water market involves, as was explained earlier, new
equilibrium points for the dierent operating agents (S to S¢, M to M¢ and L
to L¢). Thus, those farmers who sell water change their crop plans toward less
water-demanding crops with lower gross margins. The reduction of total
gross margin is partially oset by the income from selling water. For buyers,
the situation is the opposite. They move toward crops with higher gross
margins, although they have to pay for the extra water use. Hence, both
elements need to be taken into account in order to assess the overall
economic impact (see table 8).
For example, with a supply of 4000 m
3, the market equilibrium price is
®xed at 2.09 Ptas/m
3. At this price, small farmers would buy water at a cost
of 1833 Ptas/ha to increase their total gross margin to 13 645 Ptas/ha (net
result13 645 ± 183311 812 Ptas). This is due to the higher percentage of
vegetables on small (and medium) farms, crops with a higher expected gross
margin and higher water needs. In this sense, the optimum resource
allocation resulting from the water trade implies a positive bene®t for all
economic agents: small and medium farmers experience a rise in income, and
large farmers lose less than they would without the trade.
From the previous results, we can see that trade in water is of most bene®t
to small (and medium) farmers, despite the increased cost of water. The
bene®t ranged from 235 to 16 794 Ptas/ha, representing an increase in the
average total gross margin of 0.2±14.0 per cent.
In contrast, for large farmers the income from selling water does not oset
the reduction in total gross margin. This can be explained by their utility-
maximising behaviour. Thus, although the total gross margin is reduced, so
too is the variance (due to a shift toward the adoption of less risky crops),
with an overall increase in utility level.
The aggregate impact on the whole irrigated area (see last column in
table 8) is positive for supplies greater than 2000 m
3/ha. However, the
maximum gain (some 52 million Ptas, or 312 000 Euros) is insigni®cant
considering the size of the area analysed (50 000 ha). For a supply less than
2000 m
3/ha the overall impact on the community is negative.
7.3 Social impact
Table 9 presents the social impact measured in terms of the demand for farm
labour. The aggregate result shows an increase in the employment of hired
labour following the introduction of the water market. Thus, raising the
opportunity cost of water shifts the crop distribution towards crops with a
higher gross margin to water consumption ratio (0.056 for vegetables, 0.048
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Supply Price




3 D TGM Sales income Total D TGM Sales income Total D TGM Sales income Total 10
6 Ptas
4000 2.09 13 645 )1 833 11 812 2845 )389 2456 )3105 468 )2637 14.76
3800 3.95 18 855 )3 920 14 935 2369 )588 1781 )2596 906 )1691 50.97
3600 5.88 23 084 )6 865 16 218 1712 )607 1105 )3717 1421 )2296 31.35
3400 7.82 27 391 )10 597 16 794 967 )439 528 )4126 1999 )2127 32.20
3000 12.00 29 737 )14 322 15 415 )1328 879 )448 )2891 2079 )811 51.83
2500 15.65 18 007 )14 162 3 845 1998 )1472 526 )3609 3013 )596 9.20
2000 18.88 5 800 )4 718 1 082 2385 )1950 436 )2017 1525 )492 )3.45




















































































































2for cotton, 0.047 for potatoes, 0.043 for sun¯owers). These crops are more
labour-intensive (50 men/day per ha for vegetables, 12 for cotton, 2.5 for
sun¯owers).
The overall impact is relatively unimportant as the largest increment in
farm employment (corresponds with a supply of 3000 m
3/ha) is equivalent to
40 full-time workers, a small ®gure for a 50000 ha agricultural area.
8. Conclusions
The main conclusions that can be drawn from this study are:
1. Multi-attribute utility functions have proven to be a useful tool for
simulating farmers' responses to policy changes, such as the introduction
of water markets.
2. In a community of irrigators in southern Spain, a water market was likely
to operate for a water supply of less than 4218 m
3/ha, a circumstance only
feasible in drought years.
3. In this hypothetical market, small farmers (between 5 and 10 ha) and
medium farmers (10±20 ha) would be the buyers and large farmers (more
than 20 ha) the sellers. This simulation implies the transfer of water from
large to small farmers, and a corresponding monetary transfer between
groups.
4. Small and medium farmers would bene®t the most from a water market.
Small farmers could increase their total gross margin by up to 14 per cent,
although the risk involved was greater (due to a higher percentage of
vegetables).
5. The social impact was limited in terms of farm employment. There was a
slight overall increase in farm employment under the water market
scenario.



















4000 2.09 1.31 0.26 )0.25 2.66
3800 3.95 1.98 0.21 )0.41 0.80
3600 5.88 2.48 0.15 )0.27 6.81
3400 7.82 2.96 0.08 )0.29 8.09
3000 12.00 2.77 )0.10 )0.12 10.02
2500 15.65 1.36 0.17 )0.19 3.77
2000 18.88 0.67 0.21 )0.19 0.43
1000 23.70 0.33 0.22 )0.10 1.49
Source: own estimates.
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transaction costs. Furthermore, other alternative uses of water (leisure
activities, urban consumption, etc.) were omitted from the analysis. However,
this methodology may be considered as a starting point for the simulation of
policy scenarios for local water markets.
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